The Legal Blitz Against Accountants: An Analysis of Section 12 by Prentice, Robert Allen & Thompson, Jill Meznar
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 76 | Issue 2 Article 3
1987
The Legal Blitz Against Accountants: An Analysis
of Section 12
Robert Allen Prentice
University of Texas-Austin
Jill Meznar Thompson
Price Waterhouse & Co.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Accounting Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Prentice, Robert Allen and Thompson, Jill Meznar (1987) "The Legal Blitz Against Accountants: An Analysis of Section 12," Kentucky
Law Journal: Vol. 76 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol76/iss2/3
The Legal Blitz Against Accountants:
An Analysis of Section 12
BY ROBERT ALLEN PRENTICE* AND JILL MEZNAR THOMPSON**
INTRODUCTION
In the past, when accountants thought of trials, they thought
of balances, and adjusting entries. Suits to them were a sartorial
matter, in the realm of sobriety, conservatism, and quiet dress.
But in recent years associations have changed,' changed dramat-
ically-along with the very character of business in this country
Today, business is beset by legal- considerations, threats of liti-
gation, and rising insurance rates. More law suits have been filed
against accountants in the past fifteen years than in the entire
previous history of the profession. 2 And the figures seem to be
rising uncontrollably 3 From 1980 to 1987, the Big Eight ac-
counting firms paid more than $300 million in settlements of
audit-related law suits, 4 and major lawsuits pending against these
firms world-wide exceed $2 billion in requested damages. 5 This
situation has prompted threats from Lloyds of London to drop
insurance coverage of the Big Eight; but the insurance problem
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Umversity of Texas at Austin. B.A.,
University of Kansas, 1972; J.D., Washburn Umversity, 1975.
** CPA, Price Waterhouse & Co. B.A., Bryan College, 1975; M.A., William &
Mary, 1978; M.P.A., Umversity of Texas at Austin, 1986.
Accountants are becoming increasingly familiar with lawsuits. See generally
O'Brien, The Legal Environment of the Accounting Profession, 25 DUQ. L. Ray 283
(1987); Junnski, The Common Law Liability of Auditors: Judicial-Allocation of Business
Risk, 23 Wn .Em L. Ray. 367 (1987).
2 Berton, Investors Call CPAs to Account, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 28, col.
3 (quoting Newton Minow).
3 Morrison, CPA Suits Are Adding Up, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
4 Berton, Touche Ross, Setting Precedent, Names a Lawyer to Top International
Position, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 36, col. 1.
I Berton, Price Waterhouse Is Urging Formation of Group to Regulate Accounting
Firms, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
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has been felt even more keenly by small to medium-sized firms,6
who cannot afford sky-rocketing insurance rates. Some insurers
have dropped the policies of these smaller firms altogether. 7
A proliferation of legal theories used against auditors ac-
counts for much of the explosion in litigation. The common law
negligence theory has been used in many recent court decisions
to expand accountants' liability to third parties with whom the
accountants had no contractual relationship.8 In securities-related
litigation, plaintiffs have looked to the "fraud on the market
theory" 9 to support recoveries against accountants 10 under sec-
6 Galen, Litigation Blitz Hits Accountants, Nat'l L.J., June 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
7 In 1985 alone, malpractice insurance rates for firms of all sizes increased by
200% to 400%, and further increases are expected for the remainder of the decade.
Berton, Small CPA Firms' Liability Rates Soar, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1985, at 6, col.
1. Indeed, most insurers of small to medium-sized firms have stopped writing policies
in recent years. Galen, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
I E.g., International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223
Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. i986); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J.
1983); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983). But
see, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y.
1985) (largely standing by the ruling of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche & Co., 174 N.E.
441 (N.Y. 1931), holding accountants liable to third parties for fraud but not for
negligence in the absence of a privity relationship),
o 'Under this theory, a corporation's faulty financial reports can provide the basis
for lawsuits by investors who never saw the reports but who relied on the "integrity of
the market" itself. The market is assumed to reflect all available information and is
undermined by those faulty reports. E.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir.
1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459
U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
1O E.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale See. Corp., 801 F.2d 13
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 952 (1987) ($17 million judgment against Arthur
Andersen & Co. upheld). But see, e.g., Windon Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership
v. F.D.I.C., 805 F.2d 342, 347 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1605 (1987)
(absent a preexisting fiduciary relationship, an accountant had no Rule lob-5 liability
for failing to disclose material information about issuer's financial condition); Gutfreund
v. Christoph, 658 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (accountant has limited duty to
"blow the whistle" on client); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp.
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (accounting firm which did not do an audit or take part in
preparation of prospectus had no Rule lOb-5 duty to investors); DMI Furniture, Inc. v.
Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1518 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (refusing to hold
accounting firm liable under Rule 10b-5 for breach of audit contract).
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tion 10(b)" and Rule lOb-5 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. And, of course, the omnipresent RICO' 3 claim, sustained
by the Supreme Court's Sedima decision, 14 plagues both large
and small accounting firms.'
This Article focuses upon another provision that frequently
provides a cause of action in plaintiffs' securities suits against
accountants: section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.16
Our attention in this Article will center on four areas of
discussion. First, we will explain the workings of section 12.
Second, we will describe the history and the development of the
various approaches to defining "seller" under section 12.17 Third,
we will consider cases involving accounting defendants under
section 12;18 in particular, we will examine how the courts have
treated these defendants. Finally, we will present arguments that
accountants and their attorneys can lodge in favor of the strict-
privity approach to section 12 liability (the approach which
obviously is most favorable for collateral participant defendants
such as accountants). 9
In promoting strict privity as an approach to section 12
liability, we will present arguments against the broader views of
liability: proximate cause/substantial factor2° and aiding and
abetting/conspiracy. 2' Our argumentation is not merely for the
"15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
n The Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§
1962, 1964 (1983).
4 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
,, Every major accounting firm has been sued under RICO, and such suits are
now being brought against relatively small firms. E.g., Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald &
Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1562-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp.
1465, 1491 (D. Or. 1985). See generally Berton, supra note 7, at 6, col. 1.
16 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
17 See infra notes 52-87 (early developments), 89-100 (strict-privity approach), 143-
92 (proximate cause/substantial factor approach), 229-55 (aiding and abetting and con-
spiracy) and accompanying text. See generally Bershad & Grasberger, Prosecuting Public
Offering Litigation, in REcENT DravLoPmENrs iN Sacuamas LrrIOATIoN 20-32 (1984);
Annotation, Necessity of Privity Between a Purchaser and Issuer of Security in Action
Against Issuer Under § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 56 A.L.R. FED. 659 (1982).
" See infra notes 101-10 (strict-privity cases), 195-210 (proximate cause/substantial
factor cases), 256-66 (aiding and abetting and conspiracy cases) and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 212-28 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 267-80 and accompanying text.
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sake of academic dialectic. The law of section 12 is in flux.
Some federal circuits have not had occasion to decide which
view of section 12 to adopt.Y Other circuits have decided several
cases without clearly settling upon an approach.2? Part of the
conflict arises from mixed signals sent by the Supreme Court;24
in some cases the Court uses a conservative interpretation of
securities statutes, 25 and in others it stresses the remedial nature
of the laws. 26 Cogent arguments, well presented, could yet move
2 The Tenth Circuit provides one example. See In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 600 F.
Supp. 1236, 1240 (D. Utah 1984); Woods v. Homes & Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1294 (D. Kan. 1980). In Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 659-60 (10th Cir. 1987), the
court declined to choose between what we denominate the strict privity and "proximate
cause/substantial factor" approaches.
23 Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involving Public
Companies: A Plaintiff's Perspective, in NEw DIaENsIONS rN SEculrriEs LITIGATION
PLANNiNG AND STRATEOrEs 582 (1987) (court discussion of the subject deemed "murky").
The Ninth Circuit's decisions have not been particularly lucid. See Anderson v. Aurotek,
774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (using proximate cause/substantial factor test, but
unclear on aiding and abetting); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1982) (appearing to adopt a strict-privity approach); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677
F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (proximate cause/substantial factor approach applied,
but issues of aiding and abetting and conspiracy avoided). The district courts in the
Ninth Circuit are unclear on which approach they are to follow. E.g., In re Victor
Technologies Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,158 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 8, 1987) (surveying inconsistent Ninth Circuit decisions); In re Eagle Computer Sec.
Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,297 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
28, 1985) (approving aiding and abetting theory); Lazar v. Sadlier, 622 F. Supp. 1248,
1251-52 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (approving "proximate cause/substantial factor" theory).
24 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the definition of "seller" under
§ 12 but will do so this term in Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987). See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
2 E.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (narrowly defining
"manipulative" under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)
(requiring proof of scienter in SEC lOb-5 enforcement action); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977) (ruling that Rule lob-5 does not remedy mere breaches of fiduciary
duty); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that scienter must be
proved in Rule lOb-5 suit for civil damages); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that only purchasers and sellers have standing to sue for
damages under Rule lOb-5).
E.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (adopting relatively
liberal approach to definition of "security"); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 382-87, 390 (1983) (allowing cumulative remedies in securities cases and
adopting a relatively low burden of proof in Rule lob-5 cases); Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (eliminating reliance requirement-in "omis-
sion" cases under § 10(b), stating that federal securities laws should be construed flexibly,
not technically); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (holding that § 10(b) prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance "in connection with" the sale of any security).
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the law in a direction favorable to the accountant defendant.
I. ELEMENTS OF SECTION 12
Section 12 has two important subsections. The lesser used of
the two, section 12(1),27 provides an express civil cause of action
to remedy violations of section 528 of the 1933 Act. Section 12(1)
is a strict liability statute29 as to "[a]ny person who offers or
sells a security."' 30 Most of these suits involve the unregistered
offering of shares for which the issuer claims an exemption .3 A
plaintiff can win a section 12(1) suit by proving the following
elements: (a) use of mails or interstate commerce, (b) lack of
required registration, and (c) sale of securities by defendant. 32 If
these elements are established, a proper defendant's only defense
is the statute of limitations.
The other significant provision, section 12(2), 33 is an anti-
misrepresentation clause that has been described as "so potent
that both plaintiffs and defendants tend to approach it with a
sense of disbelief." 34 We quote it here in full, following Profes-
sor Loss's advice that "section 12(2) is not too happily drafted,
so it is best not to attempt a paraphrase. '35
Any person who ... (2) offers to sell a security (whether or
not exempted by the provisions of section 77c of this title,
other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said section), by
- 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
28 Id. at § 77e (1982). Section 5 forbids the offer or sale of unregistered securities,
the sale of securities unaccompanied by a prospectus, and the use of a defective
prospectus.
Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 665, reh'g granted, cause remanded, 625 F.2d
1226 (5th Cir. 1980).
- 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982). See generally, Augenbraun, Private Offerings and
Accountants' Liability Under Section 12(1): A Problem and a Recommended Solution,
7 SEC. RE. L.J. 158 (1979).
", R. PRENTICE, LAW OF Busimss ORGANIZAIONS AND SECURTmS REGULATION 518
(1987).
32 See generally Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
686 (5th Cir. 1971); Anders v. Dakota Land & Dev. Co., 380 N.W.2d 862, 867-68
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (enumerating elements a plaintiff must prove to win a § 12 suit).
" 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
"Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How
It Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 Hous. L. Rnv. 231, 231 (1976).
3 L. Loss, SEcURIms REGULATION 1699 (2d ed. 1964).
1987-88]
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the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omis-
sion), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security.
36
To establish a prima facie case under section 12(2), a plaintiff
must establish: "(a) an offer or sale of a security, (b) by the
use- of any means of interstate commerce, (c) through a pro-
spectus or oral communication, and (d) which includes an untrue
statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact."
'37
If the defendant cannot establish a statute of limitations defense,
his only recourse is a "due diligence" defense.38 Thus, section
12(2) is a negligence statute, and the burden of proof is on the
defendant. Similar to section 12(1), a defendant under section
12(2) is defined as "[a]ny person who . . .offers or sells."
'39
Although accountants are rarely "sellers" in the sense that
they part with title to securities in exchange for consideration,
4
0
they frequently find themselves as defendants in section 12 civil
suits for damages. 41 How can this be, in light of the fact that
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
37 Gridley v. Sayre & Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266, 1272-73 (D.S.D. 1976); see
also In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
31 L. Loss, supra note 35, at 1028-29.
39 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
40 See Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981); Swenson v. Englestad,
626 F.2d 421, 427 (5th cir. 1980) (It is "clear that one who parts with title to securities
in exchange for consideration is a seller for purposes of § 12().").
4, E.g., Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1560-62 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Seidel v. Public Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985); Ahem v. Gaussoin,
611 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Or. 1985); En Yun Hsu v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., [1984-1985
[VOL. 76
1987-88] ACCOUNTANT LIAnmiry
section 12 appears to impose a strict privity-requirement? 42
Early section 12 cases involving both subsections (1) and (2)i
which most courts agree should be construed comparably, 43 did
impose a strict-privity requirement. 44 Soon thereafter, a line of
cases developed which held brokers liable under section 12 on
an agency theory.45 This broader "participation" approach la-
beled as "seller" any person who participated in the sale.
46
Because the participation approach was somewhat ill-defined, it
was replaced with a "proximate cause/substantial factor" test.47
While this "proximate cause/substantial factor" approach has
become established as the majority view, two other theories
complete the modern scene. First, on the conservative side, the
strict-privity approach has enjoyed a substantial revival among
both the courts41 and the commentators. 49 Second, on the liberal
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,043 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 1985). See
generally, Gormley, Civil Liability of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws,
in AccouNTrAs' LmABIT 43-57 (1983).
42 See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF Saculrsms REGULATION 182 (1985).
43 Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d at 692; Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 991 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940); Ahern, 611 F. Supp. at 1484.
" E.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Barlas v. Bear,
Steams & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,674 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 31, 1966).
" E.g., Cady, 113 F.2d at 988.
4E.g., Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., 23 F.R.D. 281 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Wonneman
v. Stratford Sec. Co., Inc., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,923 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1959).
41 E.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985); Junker, 650 F.2d at 1349; Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp.
59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
- E.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (dicta); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1979).
41 E.g., O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 921
(1984); Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in
the Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TEm. L. Rv. 235 (1984); Comment,
Secondary Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 78 Nw. U.L.
REy. 832 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Secondary Liabillty]. But for articles applauding
the extension of liability see Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities
Laws-Charting the Proper Course, 65 OR. L. Rav. 327 (1986) (criticizing the strict-
privity approach as unduly stingy but suggesting many improvements for the more liberal
approaches); Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act: When
Is a Seller Not a Seller, 27 CASE W. REs. 445 (1977); Note, Davis v. Avco Financial
Services, Inc.: Secondary Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
side, some courts extend section 12 liability to aiders and abettors50
and to conspirators. 51
II. EARLY DEVELOPMMNTS
A. Strict-Privity Cases
Only a few early cases applied a strict-privity approach to
the definition of "seller" under section 12. Nicewarner v.
Bleavins5 2 provides an example of the early strict privity ap-
proach. Nicewarner involved an attorney defendant who per-
formed the necessary legal services for consummation of a sale
of unregistered securities in violation of section 12(1). Using a
narrow definition of the term "seller," the court refused to hold
the attorney liable even though he
had reason to anticipate a public offering; he knew that no
registration statement was in effect; he should have known
that the assignments were securities; he knew that the [buyers]
were from Illinois and could have foreseen the use of the mails
or of interstate facilities; and he could see that the [buyers]
needed the protection of the Act. 53
Nicewarner is one of the few early cases54 that can be char-
acterized as following the strict-privity approach.5 5 Almost from
1933, 16 ToL. L. REv. 775 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Davis v. Avco]; Comment, Rede-
fining "Seller" Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: Building a Securities
Tortfollo, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 157 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Redefining "Seller"];
Comment, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Proximate
Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 VAND. L. Rnv.
361 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Seller Liability].
"' E.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 1981); Woods v. Homes &
Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1295 (D. Kan. 1980); Stem v. American Bankshares
Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 824 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
51 E.g., In re Seagate Technology Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,435 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1985); deBruin v. Andromeda
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 1979); In re Caesars Palace
Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
, Id. at 266.
5 Others include Russell v. Travel Concepts Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,230 (M.D. Tenn. June 19, 1975) and Jackson Tool &
Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1964).
11 Even this characterization is questionable. O'Hara, supra note 49, at 960, views
Nicewarner as a causation case rather than a strict-privity case.
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the first use of the Act, courts have expanded the notion of
",seller."i
B. Broker/Agency Cases
As early as 1940 the courts extended the section 12 definition
of "seller" beyond the actual seller to include the seller's broker.
In Cady v. Murphy,56 the plaintiff, Murphy, a small securities
dealer, had purchased shares of South American Utilities Corp'2
through the defendant Rhoades & Co. The shares turned out to
have little value, and Murphy sued under section 12(2). The
evidence clearly established that the defendant's principal trader
had effected the sale by misrepresenting material facts, and that
the defendant should have been aware of the trader's misstate-
ments.5 7 The evidence did not clearly establish whether the de-
fendant acted as an owner or as a broker in the transaction.
The court concluded that the defendant should be liable in either
case:
§ 12(2) imposes a liability for misrepresentations not only upon
principals, but also upon brokers when selling securities owned
by other persons. This is not a strained interpretation of the
statute, for a selling agent in common parlance would describe
himself as a "person who sells," though title passes from his
principal, not from him."8
The defendant argued that Congress intended only the true
seller, not its agent, to be a section 12(2) defendant because
section 12(2) primarily provides a rescission remedy. The court
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, section 12 neither
uses the word "rescission" nor does it indicate that "the remedy
provided is limited to rescission in the narrower sense as between
the principals to the transaction. ' 59 Second, the court cited
common law precedent for allowing rescission against a seller's
agent. 60
- 113 F.2d 988 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940); see Unicorn Field,
Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Cady, 113 F.2d at 989.
M Id. at 990.
19 Id. at 991.
- Id. (citing Peterson v. McManus, 172 N.W. 460, 471 (Iowa 1919)).
1987-881
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The agency theory6 operates harshly because it deprives a
defendant, such as a brokerage firm, of the "good faith" de-
fense provided in section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.12
Section 15 extends 1933 Act liability to those who "control"
persons liable for section 12 violations.63 Section 15 also requires
that a plaintiff prove the actual seller violated the section and
prove the existence of a control relationship4 between the seller
and the section 15 defendant.65 A. section 15 defendant has the
advantage of an express defense if he can prove that he "had
no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence
of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist." 66 A principal is denied such a defense
in a cause of action based on the common law agency theory.6 7
In Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 8 the plaintiff sued
the partners of a stock brokerage firm under section 12(2) be-
61 The agency theory in Cady operated on two levels. Naturally, the brokerage
firm (principal) was held liable for the actions of its principal trader (agent). In addition,
the brokerage firm became liable as a "seller" because it was the agent of the real seller,
its customer.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1983).
61 If applicable, § 15 imposes joint and several liability on a person who controlled
a wrongdoer. Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 664 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
64 Exactly what it means to "control" another person for § 15 purposes is some-
what unclear because Congress found it undesirable to define "control," reasoning that
"[i]t would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways
in which control may be exerted." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934).
According to at least one court, a plaintiff must establish two things to recover under
§ 15: (1) that the defendant "actually ... exercised control over the operations of the
[wrongdoing issuer]," and (2) "that the defendant possessed the power to control the
specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation is predicated." Metge
v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 798 (1986).
Substantial authority exists for a more stringent standard which requires the plaintiff to
show that the defendant actually participated in the alleged violation. E.g., Orloff v.
Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1987); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880,
889-90 (3d Cir. 1975); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1974).
Section 15 is to be construed liberally. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
6E.g., McDaniel v. Compania Minera Mar de Cortes, Sociedad Anonimo, Inc.,
528 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ariz. 1981). See generally Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability
in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and
Abetting, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1009-15 (1983).
67 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
61 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
[VoL. 76
1987-88] ACCOUNTANT LiABnIITy
cause of the misrepresentations of a firm employee. Although
the partners were personally blameless and therefore would likely
have had an adequate defense to a claim under section 15,69 the
Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that Congress meant section
15 to provide the only alternative theory for liability. Instead,
the court held that section 15 supplemented, rather, than re-
placed, common law agency theory. ° The firm was held poten-
tially "liable, under familiar principles, for the tortious
representations of its agent."'
'
7
"Controlling person" liability under section 15 is not of
particular concern to accountant defendants72 who usually do
not control issuers or other true sellers. 73 Whether agency theory
or section 15 is applied, brokers seem natural defendants under
section 12.74 Even commentators who call for a narrow reading
0 San Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co., 765
F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1985).
71 Hutton, 422 F.2d at 1130.
11 Id. (citing RSATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 257, 258 (1958)).
72 Courts have not held accountants liable in cases litigated under § 15. E.g.,
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986); Grimm
v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,029 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1973). However, cases that find attorneys liable under § 15
cannot provide accountants much comfort. E.g., Seidel v. Public Serv. Co. of New
Hampshire, 616 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.N.H. 1985) ("It is difficult to perceive that a
corporation and its board of directors would not follow the advice of counsel in situations
concerning documents to be issued for examination by prospective investors, particularly
where such documents bear the imprimatur of expertise on the part of such counsel.");
Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (legal counsel may be
held liable when acting as a culpable participant in the controlled person's acts but not
when engaged only in rendering advice and handling litigation not related to securities
law or a broker's day-to-day activities); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F.
Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
73 Plaintiffs seeking to hold accountants liable as "controllers" under § 15 of the
1933 Act might cite cases decided under the 1934 Act's comparable provision, § 20(a).
However, § 20(a) cases are not truly relevant in the § 12(2) context because under §
10(b), for example, a primary violator can include a wide range of persons other than
just a seller. For example, in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 891-93
(E.D, Pa. 1978), aff'd, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982),
an accounting firm was held liable for having controlled a primary violator of § 10(b)-
its own employee who was the issuer's tax supervisor. Yet under § 20(a), accounting
firms do not control the companies they work for. E.g., Decker v. Massey-Ferguson,
Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 873, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Sec.
Litig., 484 F. Supp. 253, 268-69 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
14 E.g., Swank Fed. Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner & Co., 405 F. Supp. 385, 387
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of section 12 concede that broker-dealers may be held liable.75
Others decry courts that incorrectly ignore the qualitative dis-
tinction between what brokers do and what accountants do in
facilitating the sale of securities. 76
C. Participation Cases
In expanding section 12 "seller" liability beyond brokers,
courts had to implement a broader theory than that of agency.
The "participation" theory came to the forefront in cases like
Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co. 77 Wonneman involved
officers of a brokerage firm whose employee had allegedly made
misleading and untrue statements about securities the plaintiff
purchased. In denying the defendant officers' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court stated that the defendants must prove
"that they did not participate in the sale and not merely that
they did not actually sell the securities to plaintiff. "78 The court
indicated that one of the defendants could establish her lack of
participation only by showing that she was not a director, that
she did not attend board meetings, that she did not vote for the
sale of these securities, and that she did not supervise the firm's
activities .79
Zachman v. Erwin0 provides an application of the partici-
pation approach that goes beyond the brokerage firm setting.
The case involved a section 12(2) suit which arose from the sale
of the securities of two insurance companies. Combining the
(D. Mass. 1975) (controlling persons of brokerage firm acting as agent for issuer held
liable under § 12(1)); In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("Brokers have repeatedly been included within the coverage of both parts of §
12, whether the broker represents both parties to the transaction or only the seller.").
Of course, if the broker represents only the buyer in an agency relationship, the broker
will not be considered a "seller." E.g., Rindner v. Stockcross, Inc., [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,885 (D. Mass. Jan. 23, 1981).
71 O'Hara, supra note 49, at 988.
76 Comment, Secondary Liability, supra note 49, at 852-53.
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. June
26, 1959).
71 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. In a latter opinion in the same case, a second judge criticized the participation
approach. Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., Inc., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
, 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
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concepts of "participation" and "controller" liability under sec-
tion 15, the court found that the complaint stated a cause of
action against a broad range of defendants including: (a) officers
and directors of the issuer, (b) other corporations that had a
role in falsifying financial statements, (c) the securities dealer,
(d) an insurance reporting firm that had issued false reports on
the issuer, and (e) the issuer's "board of advisors." ' 8' Few of
these defendants actually sold the securities; most of these de-
fendants were simply involved in the broad transaction.
Similarly, in Freed v. Szabo Food Services, Inc. ,82 the court
stressed the liberal policies of the securities laws83 in holding that
any defendant-no matter how far removed from the actual
seller-could be liable under section 12(2) if he had made a
misrepresentation which the plaintiff had relied upon in pur-
chasing.8 Gould v. Tricon, Inc.85 broadens the participation test
further in stating that simply having the status of a director
whose name appears in a prospectus renders one a "seller."
The participation test obviously spelled trouble for collateral
defendants in section 12 cases. If the theory had gained a sub-
stantial following,8 6 accountant defendants would have suffered
considerable section 12 exposure. Fortunately, the very breadth
of the test led to its virtual disappearance. 7
III. MODERN APPROACHES TO DEFINING "SELLER"
As other approaches have replaced the broker/agency test 88
and the participation approach has become largely defunct, the
" Id. at 684-86.
[1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
I1rd. at 94,363-65 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963)).
'94 Id.
272 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969) also used the partici-
pation approach. Indeed, Branson, supra note 49, at 357, suggests that Katz is the only
true participation case. Grimm, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
at 96,029 quotes Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 91,674 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1966) as characterizing Freed v. Szabo
Foods Serv., Inc. and Zachman v. Erwin as being aimed only at preventing sellers from
working through straw men or underwriters. However, this interpretation of those two
cases seems unduly narrow.
10 O'Hara, supra note 49, at 956, criticizes the participation test as vague, unprin-
cipled, and inconsistent with the rescissionary remedy provided in § 12.
" The reasoning of the broker/agency cases, such as Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d
1987-88]
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courts have established three avenues to section 12 liability. The
first two-strict privity and "proximate cause/substantial fac-
tor"-are methods of establishing primary liability by defining
given defendants as "sellers." The third approach-use of aiding
and abetting and conspiracy theories-is a method of establish-
ing collateral section 12 liability for non-sellers.
A. Strict Privity
1. Key Cases
The strict-privity approach to defining "seller," which had
some modest early acceptance, 89 has been revived lately. The
leading case is Collins v. Signetics Corp.90 In Collins a purchaser
of Signetics stock sued Signetics Corporation and its parent,
Corning Glass Works, under section 12, alleging that the regis-
tration statement and prospectus did not disclose Corning's in-
tention to sell its substantial interest (ninety-two percent before
the offering; seventy percent after) in Signetics soon after the
offering was completed. Because the offering occurred pursuant
to a "firm commitment" underwriting9 and because the plaintiff
did not allege that he had purchased the shares directly from
988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940) is still cited often. Indeed, Cady seemed
to be instrumental in the recent district court decision of Quincy Coop. Bank v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1986). However, both Quincy and
Seidel v. Public Serv. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985) treat the § 12 "seller"
definition issue as unresolved in the First Circuit. Yet, in Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright
& Co., 637 F. Supp. 938, 944 (D. Mass. 1986), the court adopted a broad aiding and
abetting approach in extending § 12(2) potential liability to an engineering firm which
prepared an engineering report included in a confidential offering circular.
" See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing Nicewarner v. Bleavins,
244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965)).
605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979); see In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1418 (E.D.
Pa. 1984); B&B Investment Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 725 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (accountant defendant not discussed).
1, In a "firm commitment" underwriting, upon signing the underwriting agree-
ment, the underwriters are contractually bound to purchase all the offering company's
shares. They then resell the shares to the public at a mark-up (the "spread"). In a "best
efforts" underwriting, the underwriters do not purchase the shares; rather, they agree
to act as the issuer's agents and exert their best efforts to find purchasers. D'Alimonte,
The Letter of Intent and Basic Structure of an Offering, in SEcuRrrms UNDmRwrnNG:
A PRAcrroMma's GUME 94 (K. Bialkin & W. Grant eds. 1985).
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either Corning or Signetics, the Third Circuit affirmed a sum-
mary judgment on behalf of those two defendants:
We have no difficulty in concluding that Congress intended
the unambiguous language of § 12(2) to mean exactly what it
says: "Any person who-. . . (2) offers or sells a security...
shall be liable to the person purchasing from him .... " This
section is designed as a vehicle for a purchaser to claim against
his immediate seller. Any broader interpretation would not
only torture the plain meaning of the statutory language but
would also frustrate the statutory scheme because Congress
has also provided a specific remedy for a purchaser to utilize
against the issuer as distinguished from the seller of a security
[in § 11].92
Thus, the Third Circuit used the strict privity approach be-
cause it closely followed the literal wording of section 12, 93 and
because the court saw no reason to provide a purchaser with a
second avenue of recovery against the issuer when Congress had
expressly provided one such remedy in section 11. 94 The court
refused to address the aiding and abetting theory.95
Although Collins' narrow approach has found favor with
several commentators, 96 it has become the leading approach in
only one other federal circuit97-the Seventh, based on dicta in
Collins, 605 F.2d at 113.
Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), for the propo-
sition that "[a]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of
liability created by a particular section of the securities acts must 'rest primarily on the
language of that section.' ").
94While this conclusion pre-dated the Supreme Court's decision in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) that cumulative remedies are sometimes
appropriate, that decision does not undermine the conclusion in the text. The contrasts
that the Supreme Court drew between § 11 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
do not exist between §§ 11 and 12.
Collins, 605 F.2d at 113-14.
"6 See supra note 49.
97Arguably, the strict-privity approach has gained some acceptance in the Ninth
Circuit. See, e.g., Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 679 F.2d 1299, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982);
McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 647 (N.D. Cal. 1980). However, the
proximate cause/substantial factor test appears to have become the predominant Ninth
Circuit view. E.g., Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985); Admiralty
Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982). The appropriateness of aiding and
abetting liability is still unclear in that circuit. See infra note 242.
The Second Circuit also appears to require either strict privity or scienter (probably
1987-88]
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Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.98 Some district courts in the
Seventh Circuit do not consider the matter settled; 99 others have
used the strict-privity approach to deny section 12(2) standing
to plaintiffs who did not purchase the issued shares under fraud-
ulent circumstances. 10
2. Accountants' Cases
Most accountant defendants would prefer the strict-privity
approach to defining "seller" under section 12(2). That defini-
tion virtually guarantees that accountants will not have section
12 exposure unless they have stepped well beyond the boundaries
of what accountants and auditors normally do.
For example, in Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., '0 the plain-
tiff investors sued, among others, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co. (PMM), the firm that had acted as auditor and as account-
ant for a failing company and its parent. The court dismissed
the section 12(2) claim against PMM because that section creates
liability only for the "person purchasing such security from
through an aiding and abetting theory). E.g., Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 803 F.2d
749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986); Bozsi Ltd. Partnership v. Lynott, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,572, at 97,552 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Akerman v. Oryx Communications,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1987);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Hitchcock v. deBruyne,
377 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (D. Conn. 1974). But see Jubran v. Musikaln Corp., 673 F.
Supp. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing recovery against non-seller who "substantially
participated" in the offering).
- 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); see Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986); Frymire v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 657 F. Supp. 889, 892 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Steinberg v.
Illinois Co., 659 F. Supp. 58, 60 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
19 Schueter v. Cozad, 674 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Ambling v.
Blackstone Cattle Co., 658 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hackett v. Village Court Assoc., 602 F.
Supp. 856, 859 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Stern v. American Bankshares, 429 F. Supp. 818, 824
(E.D. Wis. 1977).
'10 See, e.g., Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Ill. 1987). In a §
10(b) situation plaintiff must be a "purchaser" or a "seller." Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 734 (1975). However, Soderberg is apparently
the first case to extend this analogy to § 12; see also Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.
v. Cullather, [1987 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,421, at 97,191 (E.D. Va.
1987) (options writer is not a "purchaser" under § 12(2)).
"1 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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him."' PMM had acted as accountant and as auditor but had
not sold the securities.
The plaintiffs in Dorfman argued in favor of a more liberal
approach, citing two precedents. But the Dorfman court distin-
guished Buchholtz v. Renard,10 3 a simple broker/agent case in
the mold of Cady v. Murphy,&4 and rejected Bailey v. Hunting-
ton Securities Co.,1 5 a conspiracy case, because the plaintiffs
had not alleged that PMM was part of a conspiracy. The plain-
tiffs also raised section 15, but the accounting firm clearly had
not "controlled" the issuer or underwriters.'
6
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (DH&S), a CPA firm, was one of
the defendants facing a section 12(2) claim in the wake of
allegations that Memorex had attempted to misrepresent its fi-
nancial condition and to conceal numerous financial problems.
In McFarland v. Memorex Corp.,0 7 the court quickly dismissed
the section 12(2) claims against DH&S, noting that "[u]nder a
literal reading of section 12, only the underwriters bear potential
liability: they are the only defendants who sold securities to the
plaintiff. Surely the accountants cannot be considered sellers
under any interpretation."
0 8
The plaintiffs sought a more liberal interpretation of the
term "seller," including invocation of the aiding and abetting
theory and the conspiracy theory. The court, however, held that
such an expansion of liability would be appropriate only if
congressional intent were unclear.' °9 The court concluded that
such intent is not unclear because section 12(2) unambiguously
allows a buyer to sue his seller for rescission. To define the
accountants as sellers would produce a curious result, the court
observed, for "it would indeed be strange ... if a victorious
plaintiff could present to the accountants for repurchase secu-
rities that they never owned.""10
"1 Id. at 1092.
101 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (no accountant defendants).
104 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
- 35 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (no accountant defendants).
116 Dorfman, 336 F. Supp. at 1093.
10 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
101 Id. at 647.
9 Id. at 648.
110 Id.; see Bozsi Ltd. Partnership, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at
1987-88]
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3. Arguments in Favor of the Strict-Privity Approach
Other cases applying a strict-privity approach to section 12
cases have reached the same result: no "seller" status for ac-
countants and therefore no liability.11' Thus, accountant defen-
dants will always favor the application of this test, and many
strong arguments exist in favor of its application."
2
First, the remedy provided in section 12 is rescissionary in
nature,' indicating that the proper defendant is the actual or
"true" seller." 4 Although there are cases to the contrary,115 the
common law, from which this remedy was derived, usually al-
lowed rescission only from the true seller." 6 Many courts take
this limitation to signify that Congress intended only the true
seller to be a defendant.1
7
Second, section 12 is unambiguous on its face. Nothing in
the statute gives any indication that the term "seller" has any
meaning other than its ordinary one.1 For example, when a tire
store sells a tire, the store's accountant is not considered a
"seller" in the transaction. In the ordinary sense of the word,
the "seller" is the person who transfers the title after negotiating
the sale.
Two different clauses in section 12 identify the proper de-
fendant as "seller," stating that "[a]ny person who-offers or
sells" can become liable, and such a person "shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him.""19 The language
97,553 (accountants cannot be viewed as "immediate and direct sellers" even under the
most expansive view).
" E.g., Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1560-62 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
",2 As the succeeding footnotes will illustrate, the commentators, not the courts,
have made the most of these arguments. The courts that have adopted the strict-privity
approach have not written persuasive opinions in support of that view.
"I If the plaintiff no longer holds the securities, so that rescission becomes impos-
sible, damages may be recovered. Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1362 (5th Cir. 1981);
In re Itel See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
"4 O'Hara, supra note 49, at 943j 1002.
"I E.g., Peterson v. McManus, 172 N.W. 460, 471 (Iowa 1919).
116 E.g., Hafner v. A.J. Stuart Land Co., 224 N.W. 630, 632 (Mich. 1928).
M E.g., Collins, 605 F.2d at 113; Akerman, 609 F. Supp. at 374; McFarland, 493
F. Supp. at 648.
"' O'Hara, supra note 49, at 992-93 n.387.
", 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (emphasis added).
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does not lend itself to interpretation; it has a literal and direct
meaning, devoid of ambiguity.
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that "a determi-
nation of the standard of liability under the various provisions
of the federal securities laws must begin with and rest primarily
on the language of the statutes."' 12 In its reading of securities
laws, the Court has gravitated toward a conservative, narrow
interpretation of statutory language.
The language of the Securities Act of 1933 shows that Con-
gress did create liability for persons other than the issuer or the
seller when it so desired.' 2 1 For example, section 1112 provides
an entire list of potential defendants. In section 15,'2 Congress
provided for "controller" liability. That Congress did not make
any such provision in section 12 indicates an intent not to create
liability for collateral participants such as accountants. 124
Indeed, in section 11, Congress spoke of "participants" in
contrast to its use of the singular "seller" in section 12.125
Furthermore, because Congress provided a list of multiple de-
fendants in section 11, that provision contains a method of
adjusting the liabilities among the parties. 126 The absence of such
11o Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Minn.
1981) (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 200-01; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)). The Court could have, but did not, cite Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 723.
121 Since congressional intent is the overriding issue, the argument that the strict-
privity approach may mean no recovery for innocent investors, because the true seller
may be insolvent, is not convincing. See Branson, supra note 49, at 345. This is analogous
to arguing that a specific intent statute should be construed to cover negligence because
plaintiffs suffer the same injury whether defendants intend to do wrong or are simply
careless. Justice Blackmun made this argument in his dissent in Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Obviously, the majority in Hochfelder did not accept
the argument.
1- 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
3 Id. at § 77o.
124 Accountants are expressly listed as potential defendants in § 11. Their liability
extends only to errors contained in the portion of the registration statement that they
prepare. Id. at § 77k(a)(4).
125 See Comment, Secondary Liability, supra note 49, at 858.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1982):
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) shall
be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to
make any payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases
of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been
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a provision in section 12 also indicates that Congress did not
intend to extend liability to multiple defendants.12 7
Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 12 is brief. 28
However, the report of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce,1 29 submitted in 1933, discussed section 12
liability only in terms of the "seller" (singular)'30 and emphasized
that liability should not extend to persons such as preparers of
financial statements, because their responsibility merely involved
paper activity.
13'
Arguably, whenever Congress provides a relatively low bur-
den of proof for plaintiffs, as in section 12,132 it limits the
number of potential defendants. But when Congress imposes a
relatively high burden of proof, as in section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, it increases the number of potential defendants. 33 In section
12 no scienter is required for liability. 34 Instead, the section
places the burden on the defendant to prove "that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable
was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
127 See O'Hara, supra note 49, at 990-91.
123 Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 29 (1959).
12 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
11 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131 Id.
132 Commentators have formulated numerous suggestions for bolstering the defenses
of unfortunate defendants against § 12(1) liability. E.g., Schneider & Zall, Section 12(1)
and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed I & I Defense, 28 Bus. LAw.
1011 (1973) (issuer should have defense against § 12(1) liability arising out of an innocent
and immaterial defect in offer or sale).
"3 Branson, supra note 38, at 350 (noting a natural "sliding scale"); see Rapp,
supra note 38, at 491; Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability Under § 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 1982 Aiz. ST. L.J. 529, 573 (1982).
In Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1299 (1973), the court said:
It is apparent that in passing the 1933 Act Congress could not have intended
that purchasers of securities who could not sue directors under Section 11
could sue such directors (unless privity or scienter were found) under
Section 12(2). Since the public interest in private offerings is less clear than
that in public offerings, the duties imposed upon directors in private
offerings were intended to be correspondingly less stringent.
'11 University Hill Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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known" of the misrepresentation.135 In the Committee report
accompanying what became the 1933 Act, Congress justified this
shift of the usual burden of proof
as both just and necessary, inasmuch as the knowledge of the
seller as to any flaw in his selling statements or the failure of
the seller to exercise reasonable care are matters in regard to
which the seller may readily testify, but in regard to which the
buyer is seldom in a position to give convincing proof.
136
To allow section 12 plaintiffs to reach a large number of
collateral defendants without proving scienter 137 or reliance 8
circumvents the procedural requirements that Congress imposed.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder1
39
counsels against such an action. 140 Section 10(b) is a "catch-all"
antifraud provision;14' section 12 is not. 142
B. Proximate Cause/Substantial Factor
1. Key Cases
The seminal case Lennerth v. Mendenhal"43 is widely recog-
nized for spelling out what has become the majority approach
I's 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). Regarding the burden of proof on the defendant, see
Justice Powell's dissent to a denial of certiorari in John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981). See Junker; 650 F.2d at 1361; Quincy Coop. Bank, 655 F. Supp. at
84.
136 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1933) (emphasis added).
,17 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does, after all, require a showing of scienter.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185. To meet this requirement, most circuits hold that "reck-
lessness" will suffice. E.g., Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir.
1984); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
-' Reliance is not an element of § 12(2) recovery. Junker, 650 F.2d at 1362; Klein
v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Reliance is generally
considered an element in § 10(b) cases. E.g., Rifin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 261-62 (5th
Cir. 1978). However, even in § 10(b) cases, the reliance requirement has been eliminated
in "mere omission" cases such as in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153-54 (1972), and loosened for active misrepresentation cases in which the "fraud
on the market" theory applies. See supra note 9.
139 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
11o Id. at 210.
14, Comment, Seller Liability, supra note 49, at 400.
142 See id.
141 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
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to the section 12(2) "seller" definition. The court addressed the
"seller" status of Roger, who had initiated contact with the
plaintiff investors by phone, had outlined the details of the
issuer's venture at an initial meeting and had described it as
successful and well-financed. These representations and esti-
mated profits were reiterated at a second meeting, and the plain-
tiffs were introduced to the issuer's vice-president at a third
meeting.
The court briefly discussed the broker/agent view of Cady
and the participation approach of Wonneman. The decision's
key language is as follows:
[L]iability must lie somewhere between the narrow view, which
holds only the parties to the sale, and the too-liberal view
which would hold all who remotely participated in the events
leading up to the transaction. We think that the line of de-
marcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To
borrow a phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to
the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from the actions of
this particular defendant? If the answer is in the affirmative,
we would hold him liable. But for the presence of the defen-
dant Roger in the negotiations preceding the sale, could the
sale have been consummated? If the answer is in the negative
and we find that the transaction could never have materialized
without the efforts of that defendant, we must find him guilty.144
After characterizing Roger's activities as tantamount to doing
"everything but draw and sign the contract," the court con-
cluded that "[t]he hunter who seduces the prey and leads it to
the trap he has set is no less guilty than the hunter whose hand
springs the snare." 145 Roger was deemed a "seller" in keeping
with "the liberal remedial spirit of the securities laws." 146
The inclusion of negligence principles in section 12(2) cases
has become extremely popular; however, the "but for" approach
of Lennerth has been deemed too broad. 47 "But for" the assis-
tance of secretaries who type letters and contracts, many trans-
'4 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
145 Id.
,4 Id.
,47 See infra notes 148-210 and accompanying text.
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actions would not occur. Therefore, refinements to the approach
were inevitable. The anticipated refinements came from the Fifth
Circuit.
In Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises,
Inc.,148 the Fifth Circuit, quoting extensively from the Lennerth
opinion, held the defendants liable, under sections 12(1) and
12(2), as "sellers" who were the motivating force behind a
pyramid scheme disguised as a franchise operation. 149 The defen-
dants had sought out the original incorporators, had trained
them to solicit additional capital, had provided sales brochures,
and had rendered advice on every aspect of the corporate for-
mation and subsequent development. The Hill York opinion
quoted the "proximate cause" language from Lennerth but omit-
ted any reference to the "but for" test.15 0
In Lewis v. Walston & Co., the Fifth Circuit addressed
the "seller" status of a securities broker who had touted the
issuer's stock, showed the plaintiffs pictures of the issuer's ma-
chine, voiced repeated optimistic predictions for the issuer's
stock, arranged a meeting between the plaintiffs and principals
of the issuer, and falsely stated that the securities firm would
take a position in the issuer's securities. The court cited Hill
York for establishing the "proximate cause" test as the proper
approach in defining a "seller.' 52 In concluding that the defen-
dant was properly termed a "seller," the court added, signifi-
cantly, that "[tihe jury could permissibly infer from these facts
that [defendant's] actions were a 'substantial factor' in bringing
about the plaintiffs' purchases, and thus the 'proximate cause'
of those purchases."'' Casually used above, the term "substan-
tial factor"' 54 became an element in the "proximate cause/sub-
148 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
4 Id. at 692-93.
1SO Id. at 693.
I' 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
"1 Id. at 621-22.
"' Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
1"4 Although the Lewis opinion seemed to pluck the "substantial factor" test out
of mid-air, a Fifth Circuit opinion rummaged around and found some precedent for it.
Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Sprayregen v. Livingston
Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
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stantial factor" test, currently the majority approach in section
12 cases. 155
Over the years the proximate cause/substantial factor test,
with some minor alterations,' 56 has become the favored approach
for a majority of the circuit courts-the Second, 57 the Fourth,"58
the Fifth,159 the Sixth, 160 the Eighh,161 the Ninth, 62 the Elev-
enth,' 6' and perhaps the Tenth' 64 (although some of these courts
supplement it with the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy
theories). 6 5
Davis v. Avco Financial Services, Inc.'" is one case worthy
of discussion because it is recent, thoughtful, and addresses
collateral participant liability. The plaintiffs invested in Glenn
15 See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
116 Some courts emphasize the "proximate cause" language of the test while others
emphasize the "substantial factor" term. This fact has led some observers to treat them
as separate approaches. E.g., Quincy Coop. Bank, 655 F. Supp. at 83. See generally
Bershad & Grasberger, supra note 17.
" E.g., In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (also accepting aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories); Klein, 591 F. Supp.
at 280 (also accepting aiding and abetting). But see Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450,
454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (strict privity required).
"' E.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1986); Lawler
v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978) (stressing "substantial factor" language).
"I In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d
709, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo, 621 F.2d at 667.
160 See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985).
" Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d
879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977) (adding as a consideration "whether the defendant was uniquely
positioned to ask relevant questions, acquire material information, or disclose his find-
ings" with regard to the sale).
162 Anderson, 774 F.2d at 930; Admiralty Fund, 677 F.2d at 1294. But see Feldman,
679 F.2d at 1305 (apparently applying the strict privity test); In re Rexplore, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 671 F. Supp. 679, 685-86 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting different approaches to defmiing
"substantial factor"); Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Poirier, 653 F. Supp. 63, 67
(D. Or. 1986) (using "participant" language).
I63 See, e.g., Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838, 846 (11th Cir.
1985).
'1' E.g., Farlow v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., 666 F. Supp. 1500, 1504 (W.D.
Okla. 1987); In re Wicat Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D. Utah 1984); Woods
v. Homes & Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1294 (D. Kan. 1980); see Busch v. Carpenter,
827 F.2d 653, 659-60 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying this test but refusing to rule out strict
privity approach).
See infra notes 229-55 and accompanying text.
'" 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985).
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W. Turner's famous "Dare to be Great" (DTBG) pyramid
scheme. 67 Salespeople, following Turner's "fake it until you
make it" philosophy, based the scheme on hard-sell tactics and
promises of quick wealth. One defendant, Avco, provided loans
secured by promissory notes to potential investors. An Avco
manager attended three meetings of DTBG and provided poten-
tial investors with blank Avco loan application forms. At one
of the meetings he made a speech to offer investment financing
through Avco. Forty-eight people eventually borrowed $2,000 or
more each from Avco to invest in DTBG.1
68
The Sixth Circuit deemed the proximate cause/substantial
factor test "an appropriate synthesis of the sometimes antithet-
ical policies that the securities laws are to be construed as statutes
while, at the same time, giving effect to their far-reaching re-
medial purpose.' '169 Avco and its manager became liable to each
plaintiff who testified that the manager's actions were a sub-
stantial factor in their decision to buy DTBG securities.
A review of the proximate cause/substantial factor cases
reveals that the test is generally not applied consistently, al-
though a number of trends can be identified. Several cases have
stated that under this test a "seller" must have a) actively
solicited an order, b) negotiated the sale, or c) made arrange-
ments for the sale.? 0 In the realm of selling activities, the fol-
lowing constitute "substantial factors" that proximately cause a
sale of securities: a broker's seeking out the plaintiff investor,
recommending the issuer's bonds, and supplying all the infor-
mation that the investor received;' 7' a dealer-manager's putting
'17 See e.g., In re Glenn W. Turner Enter. Litig., 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Koskot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enter. Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
I' Davis, 739 F.2d at 1061.
"6 Id. at 1067.
11 In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1985); In re
Diasonics Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 447, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Branson studied 14 cases
involving corporate officials as defendants in cases in which courts applied the "sub-
stantial factor/proximate cause" test. In 10 of the 14 cases, the defendants had no
communications with the plaintiff investors leading up to or at the time of sale. In all
10 cases, defendants were not liable. Branson, supra note 49, at 347.
" Quincy Coop. Bank, 655 F. Supp. at 82-84; see Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F.
Supp. 235, 241 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (defendant's signing of a "warrant letter" that induced
plaintiffs to invest money in a cattle leasing agreement was a proximate cause of the
sale).
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an offering together, ensuring that the dealer alone controls the
flow of information by requiring the exclusive use of its offering
circular, determining the terms and the conditions of the sale,
and acting as the administrator and holder of letters of credit;
172
and a management consultant's creating limited partnerships to
channel an investor's funds to an entrepreneur, rather than
simply introducing the investor to the issuer as the investor had
requested. 173
On the other hand, courts have not considered the following
as "substantial factors" proximately causing a sale: being the
issuer in a firm commitment underwriting, 74 acting as a lead
underwriter,175 or even acting as an underwriter and making a
single favorable comment to an investor's accountant. 76
Another case in this area involved a real estate agent who
flew the plaintiffs over the issuer's property, introduced them to
the sellers, and received a commission on the sale. Because the
agent was not "uniquely positioned" to ask questions about the
transaction and was not in a position to lower the sale price as
the true seller could have, his activity was not considered a
"substantial factor.' ' 7 7
'72 Adalman, 807 F.2d at 364. Defendant was also. an affiliate of the issuer. Id.
" Lawler, 569 F.2d at 1288; see Lukovich v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,701, at 93,413 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 1986)
(both broker and brokerage firm held to be "sellers"); In re Eagle Computer Sec. Litig.,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,297, at 92,017 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 28, 1985) (doing acts commonly necessary to marketing securities can constitute a
substantial factor); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,504, at 96,927-28 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
1983) (broker and brokerage firm held to be "sellers" but not broker's supervisors).
171 Akerman, 609 F. Supp. at 374; Wicat Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. at 1240.
7 Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 837, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
16 Foster, 759 F.2d at 839. In these other cases the defendants' actions were held
insufficient to constitute "substantial factors." Activision, 621 F. Supp. at 421 (defen-
dant officers drafted prospectus, participated in "road show" information presentations
to securities brokers and investment analysts, analyzed the market and set the price of
the shares, and negotiated an agreement with the underwriters); Diasonics, 599 F. Supp.
at 457; Deneau v. Walker, No. C82-3132 MPH, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1983)
(issuer's principals created securities and a plan for their issuance, arranged for listing
on the NYSE, arranged for SEC filings, supplied the public with data about the issuer
through SEC materials, and arranged mechanisms for the transfer of deposit slips);
Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975) (broker-dealer acted as plaintiff buyer's agent, but its name
appeared on the confirmation slip as the principal).
I" Anders v. Dakota Land & Dev. Co., 380 N.W.2d 862, 867-68 (Minn. Ct. App.
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The general notion that merely assisting in the preparation
of a registration statement and prospectus does not constitute a
"substantial factor" in the sale of the securities being registered
should provide comfort to lawyers and accountants.' 78 In one
case, an attorney wrote an opinion letter concluding that the
issuer's margin transactions were exempt from the securities
laws. 7 9 The letter became part of an auditor's report that was
referred to in an advertising brochure the issuer compiled. The
court held the attorney's actions did not constitute a "substantial
factor" in the transaction. 80 Nor did an attorney's actions be-
come a "substantial factor" in the sale of securities out of a
"boiler room"'' operation even though the attorney knew the
nature of the operation, represented the broker-dealer in a suit
to force the phone company to install phones, arranged for
additional space for the broker-dealer and negotiated the lease,
arranged for state registration, and worked nearly nine hours a
day for the broker-dealer.8 2 Similarly, an attorney's actions were
not a "substantial factor" in an issuer's sale when the attorney
untangled the legal debris created by the issuer's fraudulent acts,
prepared corporate minutes, attempted to trace missing funds,
responded to investor complaints, and served as a channel of
1986). This ruling may not give a true reading of the proximate cause/substantial factor
test because the court gave substantial weight to the unique Eighth Circuit approach
which considers whether a defendant was "uniquely positioned" to ask questions about
the accuracy of representations. Id.
"I' Gas Reclamation, Inc., 659 F. Supp. at 505; In re Victor Technologies Sec.
Litig., [Current Binder] Fed, Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,158, at 95,716 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
8, 1987); Fine v. Rubin, 623 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Ahem v. Gaussoin,
611 F. Supp. 1465, 148Z (D. Or. 1985); In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 604 F. Supp.
150, 160-64 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l, Inc., [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep, (CCH) 99,222, at 95,904 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
1982).
However, not all courts appear to agree. E.g., Eagle Computer, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,017-18 (refusing to hold that such activities could
never constitute a substantial factor in a sale).
I" Stokes, 644 F.2d at 782.
18 Id. at 785.
"I A boiler room operation typically involves "cold" calling of names derived from
a "sucker" list. The calls aggressively recommend large blocks of speculative securities
using misleadingly optimistic predictions of earnings. E.g., In re Harold Grill, 41 SE.C.
321 (1963).
"1 Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 347 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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communication between the issuer and an attorney hired to
represent the issuer in state investigations. 13
Alternatively, the following attorneys' actions constituted
"substantial factors," making the attorneys liable as "sellers"
under section 12: a) proposing a merger, advocating it as a
solution for the issuer's problems, preparing the necessary doc-
uments, and attempting to persuade investors to support the
merger; 8 4 and b) acting as the principal architect of a loan
brokerage agreement designed to avoid detection as an integrat-
able offering and to minimize section 12(1) exposure. 8 5
Before we proceed to cases involving accountants' liability
under the proximate cause-substantial factor test, one more re-
cent case deserves attention. Dahl v. Pinter'8 6 involved an opti-
mistic investor, Dahl, who was quite taken with an oil and gas
venture that Pinter had put together. Dahl was so enthusiastic
that he not only invested his own funds in the project, but he
also solicited friends and family to invest. Dahl received no
compensation from Pinter for these efforts; his motivation sim-
ply consisted of a desire to enrich family and friends. Dahl
helped the other investors complete investment letter-contracts,
knowing the interests were being sold without registration. He
was apparently unaware of the legal violation involved.' s7
When interests in Pinter's enterprise proved worthless, Dahl
and the other investors sued, claiming a section 12 violation. In
defense, Pinter claimed that because of Dahl's promotional ac-
tivities, he, too, was liable as a "seller" and should pay contri-
bution to Pinter.18 Although the Fifth Circuit had no difficulty
in concluding that Dahl's efforts were a "substantial factor"
which "proximately caused" the other plaintiffs' investments, 1 9
it declined to hold Dahl liable as a seller. The court based its
Van Boeckel v. Weiss, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,648, 97,589 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1983).
Junker, 650 F.2d at 1360.
Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 843 (S.D. Cal. 1985); see Parquitex
Partners v. Registered Fin. Planning Serv., Inc., [1987 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,255, at 96,226 (D. Or. 1987).
1- 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987).
I8 Id. at 986-87.
Id. at 987.
"' Id. at 990-91.
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conclusion on a decision to add the additional element of self-
interest to the definition of "seller":
The substantial factor test was formulated and has been ap-
plied under facts which differ substantially from the facts of
this case. In every case we have found employing this test (or
its substantial equivalent), the person sought to be held liable
as a "seller" received or hoped to receive some financial
benefit from his efforts. We believe that had this circuit pre-
viously been confronted with a promoter of unregistered se-
curities whose efforts were intended to benefit neither the seller
nor himself, we would have created a different test. That test
would have incorporated a threshold requirement that the pro-
moter be motivated by a desire to confer a direct or indirect
benefit on someone other than the person he has advised to
purchase. We believe that a rule imposing liability (without
fault or knowledge) on friends and family members who give
one another gratuitous advice on investment matters unreason-
ably interferes with well-established patterns of social dis-
course. Absent express direction by Congress, we decline to
impose liability for mere gregariousness.190
Dahl v. Pinter becomes more important because the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari'91 and it may address this important
section 12 issue for the first time.'2
2. Accountants' Cases
The "proximate cause/substantial factor" approach is not
as favorable to section 12 accountant defendants as is the "strict
privity" approach. Nonetheless, this approach is not as harsh as
the participation approach' 93 or, in at least some instances, as
harsh as the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy ap-
proaches.' 94 One of its biggest failings, as shall be seen, is its
inconsistency in application.
' Id. (citations omitted). Judge Brown lodged a strong dissent against this addi-
tional requirement. Id. at 992-95.
M Dahl, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987).
Mn The Supreme Court's decision may also address the in pari delicto doctrine
recently applied in Eichler, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2623 (1985).
93 See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 229-80 and accompanying text.
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A leading case out of California is Mendelsohn v. Capital
Underwriters, Inc.,195 in which the defendant accounting firm,
Harris, Kerr, Forster & Co. (HKF), was retained to set up
bookkeeping records and to prepare corporate tax returns for
the issuer. HKF's goal was to "clean up" the issuer's book-
keeping practices. HKF did this and also prepared various tax
returns. HKF did no work in connection with the preparation
of any prospectuses or offering circulars; however, without HKF's
authorization, the issuer incorporated into a prospectus two tax
letters that HKF wrote. HKF had no direct contact with potential
investors and had never expressed any opinion on the financial
condition of the issuer or any of its related entities.
196
The court concluded that setting up books to record faith-
fully the issuer's dubious transactions did not constitute a "sub-
stantial factor" in the plaintiffs' decision to invest. 97 Therefore,
HKF was not deemed a "seller" under section 12.191
In Ahern v. Gaussoin,199 the accounting firm of Touche Ross
& Co. prepared financial statements which were included in the
issuer's registration statement and prospectus. 2 ° Additionally,
Touche Ross's manager for the account spoke at a shareholders'
meeting:
Qur firm gave your Management and its accounting practices
a clean bill of health for 1981 ... I am very encouraged by
your growth plans and in the way your Board and Management
have handled the Company's business in these recessionary
times. Many companies have not done as well: keep up the
good work....
I am looking forward to reporting to you a "clean bill of
health" at your Annual Meeting for many years to come.20'
This alleged "sales pitch," coupled with the assistance given in
preparing the prospectus and registration statement, was deemed
195 490 F. Supp. 1069 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
196 Id. at 1076-77.
" Id. at 1085.
i Id. at 1087.
'" 611 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Or. 1985).
Id. at 1472.
20, Id. at 1486.
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not sufficient to constitute a "substantial factor" in the sale;
Touche Ross was not a section 12 "seler.)
20 2
Yet in In re Wickes Co.,2°3 the plaintiffs alleged that Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM) prepared a report, financial
statements, and "comfort letters" that contained material mis-
representations and omissions and that did not fairly represent
the issuer's financial condition. The plaintiffs also claimed the
financial statements failed to disclose that PMM would not
continue to audit the issuer's books and that the proposed new
company would suffer substantial losses because of changes in
accounting policies. 2  These allegations were held sufficient to
state a section 12(2) claim against PMM as a "seller." 2°s
PMM met with a similarly unfavorable result in Gold v.
LTV Corp.,2 in which the court held simply that "[a]n accoun-
tant's evaluation of a corporation's financial condition surely
can constitute a 'substantial factor' in inducing sales of that
Id.
2*1 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,055 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
6, 1983).
2' Id. at 95,006.
2O0 Id. at 95,009. PMM fared better in Gas Reclamation, Inc., [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,020, in which its relationship with the issuer began
several months after the allegedly misleading private placement memorandum was pre-
pared and in which the plaintiffs did not allege the existence of any misleading documents
attributable to PMM. Naturally, PMMs actions were held not to be "substantial
factors" proximately causing the sale.
PMM similarly escaped liability in Farlow, 666 F. Supp. at 1500, in which it
allegedly certified false financial statements used in a promoter's "ponzi" scheme.
Plaintiffs had difficulty finding any specific errors in financial statements that were
actually included in offering circulars, although they did allege that some PMM financial
statements were hand-delivered to them by the promoter. The allegation that PMM was
a "substantial factor" in the sale of securities because plaintiffs would not have pur-.
chased them "[i]f PMM had properly disclaimed, qualified, or footnoted the financial
statements" was rejected as inadequate, being
indicative of the most remote connection with the sale of the limited
partnerships.... Plaintiffs must do more than allege Peat Marwick was
a substantial factor in causing the sale; plaintiffs must also allege facts
which tend to show Peat Marwick's participation in the buy-sell transaction
in order to satisfy the substantial factor test ...
Id. at 1504 (emphasis omitted and in original).
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,654 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24,
1984). This brief conclusion is at odds with the more widely held view that assisting
with preparation of a registration statement and prospectus does not constitute a "sub-
stantial factor" under this test. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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corporation's stock." 2°7 This is a broad interpretation of the
"substantial factor" element that harkens back to the partici-
pation approach °8
Finally, in En Yun Hsu v. Leaseway Transportation Corp.,2
the defendant accounting firm, which had been the plaintiffs'
financial advisor for seven years, convinced the plaintiffs to
invest in a truck leasing scheme that the defendant arranged and
managed through a corporation the defendant's individual ac-
countants owned. The defendant's principals altered some in-
vestment documents, signed documents on the plaintiffs' behalf
without a power of attorney, and made several misrepresenta-
tions to the plaintiffs about the progress of the venture. The
court decided the accounting firm acted as a seller under section
12(1); its involvement clearly, became a "significant factor" in.
leading the plaintiffs to invest in the venture. 210
At least two conclusions may be drawn from this survey of
accountants' cases under the proximate cause/substantial factor
test. First, the decisions applying the test are not consistent.211
Second, accountants who stray from their ledgers, like shoemak-
ers who stray from their lasts, risk facing legal trouble by being
characterized as section 12 "sellers."
3. Arguments Against the Proximate Cause/Substantial
Factor Test
Accountant defendants in section 12 cases will want to con-
vince courts to reject the proximate cause/substantial factor
- Id. at 99,307.
21 See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,043 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
29, 1985).
210 Id. at 91,199, Contra Croy, 624 F.2d at 709, in which the defendant was an
attorney and a CPA who gave tax and investment advice to the plaintiffs. The defendant
told the plaintiffs that the issuer's tax shelter was one of the best he had seen. He
reviewed one of the issuer's brochures with the plaintiffs and made projections of the
plaintiffs' tax liability based on the issuer's numbers. The defendant never made an
independent investigation of the project and considered himself the plaintiffs' attorney
although the issuer paid his fee for giving this advice. Id. at 711. The defendant was
held not to be a § 12 "seller" under the proximate cause/substantial factor test. Id. at
714.
2I See supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
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approach and to use instead the strict privity test which is the
more advantageous and reasonable choice. 2 2 The courts that
adopt the tort-based proximate cause/substantial factor ap-
proach frequently justify their choice by reference to the reme-
dial purposes of the securities laws.213 However, such remedial
purpose is not an automatic justification for departing from the
statutory language of section 12.214 As indicated earlier, the
language of section 12, properly read, seems to require a strict
privity relationship as a prerequisite to recovery. 215 If the statu-
tory language is clear, the "remedial purpose" of the Securities
Act of 1933 should not enter the analysis.
216
Certainly many commentators are concerned about injured
plaintiffs remaining uncompensated and wrongdoing defendants
going unpunished.21 7 These policy factors ordinarily would de-
serve consideration; however, the language of section 12 ex-
presses a clear meaning. Furthermore, if courts want to extend
liability beyond the true seller to promote these policies, sections
11, 15, and 17(a)218 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act can serve this function. 21
9
When the Supreme Court addresses policy factors in securi-
ties litigation, it uses a rather conservative approach. In Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,22° for example, now Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion limited the right to bring a
2,2 See supra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
213 E.g., In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180; 181-82 (1963)).
214 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1979) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
2M2 See supra notes 48, 52-76 and accompanying text.
216 See Davis, 739 F.2d at 1069-70 (Lively, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
217 E.g., Branson, supra note 49, at 345; Note, Davis v. Avco, supra note 49, at
818; Comment, Seller Liability, supra note 49, at 390.
238 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). A private cause of action under § 17(a) is not
recognized in all circuits but appears to be available in the Fourth Circuit (Newman v.
Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975)), the Seventh Circuit (Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551
(1979)), and the Ninth Circuit (Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Only the Fifth Circuit (Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th Cir.
1982)) and the Eighth Circuit (Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 n.1 (8th Cir.
1986)) have clearly rejected such a cause of action.
219 O'Hara, supra note 49, at 998.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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civil damages action under section 10(b) to actual buyers and
sellers of securities. 221 His opinion voiced concern about vexa-
tious litigation and about potentially undermining judicial econ-
omy,2n problems that can result from reading the securities laws
too liberally. Extending section 12 "seller" status beyond the
strict privity relationship requirement runs against each of these
policies. Professor Schneider has observed:
The fundamentally factual inquiry of causation would offend
each of the Blue Chip considerations. Enlarging the potential
defendant class would increase the opportunities for vexatious
litigation against numerous parties and would disrupt numer-
ous businesses. Finally, because the inquiry about causation is
fundamentally a factual inquiry, a court's rendering disposition
without trial would be most unlikely.22
While some commentators support the proximate cause/sub-
stantial factor test for injecting some standards into the defini-
tion of "seller,"' ' such standards only became necessary because
some courts needlessly extended the "seller" definition beyond
strict privity by using the unprincipled participation approach.Y2
This extension violates the Supreme Court's directive that prin-
ciples of statutory construction should determine the scope and
availability of remedies under the securities laws.2
Furthermore, resorting to the tort principle of "proximate
causation," as complicated by the "substantial factor" language,
creates a large degree of uncertainty for potential section 12
defendants,227 especially collateral participants such as account-
ants and attorneys. The cases discussed in this section clearly
illustrate how inconsistent court decisions can be. How then, are
defendants to predict the way a jury will judge their conduct?
In multimillion dollar transactions, the inability to out-guess a
future jury is particularly frightening. Professor Leon Green has
noted that "in financial transactions certainty, ease in determin-
=' Id. at 742, 749, 755.
Id. at 739-49.
Schneider, supra note 49, at 263.
124Comment, Redefining "Seller," supra note 49, at 170-71.
223 See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
21 See Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 578.
2 Schneider, supra note 49, at 262.
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ing liability and uniformity in result are at a premium. The rule
of law must have a high degree of predictability and decisive-
ness. "
M228
C. Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy
The most controversial approach to section 12 liability con-
cerns extending exposure to aiders and abettors and to co-con-
spirators of the primary violators. 229 These two extensions are
not mentioned in the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act, but virtually
every circuit court addressing the issue has accepted them as a
proper basis for broadening liability under at least some sections
of the Acts. 0 Our concern is specifically with section 12.23'
The conditions necessary for aiding and abetting liability are
well-established: (a) an independent wrong must have existed,
(b) the aider and abettor must have known of its existence, and
(c) the aider and abettor must have provided substantial assis-
tance in effecting the wrong.
"2
To hold a defendant liable under a conspiracy theory, a
court must find: (a) the existence of a plan to accomplish a
securities violation, (b) the defendant's participation in the ven-
ture, and (c) the defendant's intention to make the plan suc-
ceed.13
In Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 UCLA L. REv. 464, 472
(1964-65), quoted in Schneider, supra note 49, at 262 n.147. Professor Branson shares
Green's concern but believes that the tort approach is proper and can be improved by
more fully utilizing traditional tort factors such as foreseeability, cost-benefit evaluation,
and the remedial nature of the securities laws. Branson, supra note 49, at 357-59.
An important distinction exists between extending primary liability by broadening
the definition of "seller" and by resorting to secondary liability through the aiding and
abetting or the conspiracy theories. See id. at 332; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indem-
nification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv. 597, 600 (1972).
I" T. HAzEN, supra note 42, at 208-09. In Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7,
the Supreme Court expressly refused to decide the applicability of aiding and abetting
under the securities laws.
211 See generally Comment, supra note 133, at 531 (arguing in favor of an aiding
and abetting approach to § 12(2)).
232 Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cit. 1983); Monsen v. Consol.
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1978); Tkaczuk v. Weill, [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,199, at 95,933 (N.D. IUl. Jan. 28, 1987).
"I See generally Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The following circuits appear to accept the aiding and abet-
ting theory, the conspiracy theory, or both in section 12 actions:
First,234 Second,235 Fourth,236 Sixth, 237 Eighth,238 and Tenth.21
Only the Third24 and the Seventh241 Circuits appear to reject
both theories. The Ninth Circuit's position is hopelessly mud-
dled.u2 However, almost all of these conclusions are based on
district court cases. The only-circuit courts to address the issue
directly are the Second in Akerman v. Oryx Communications,
2- Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 637 F. Supp. 938, 944 (D. Mass. 1986)
(aiding and abetting only).
23s Gas Reclamation, Inc., 659 F. Supp. at 503 (aiding and abetting and conspiracy);
Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,207, at 91,569 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1985) (aiding and abetting only); Klein, 602 F.
Supp. at 843 (both); Lorber, 407 F. Supp. at 288 (both); Caesars Palace, 360 F. Supp.
at 383 (both); see Akerman, 810 F.2d at 344 (holding that to be liable under § 12(2), a
mere "participant" must at least act with scienter).
6 Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 744 (W.D. Va. 1982)
(aiding and abetting only).
21 Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D.
Ohio 1975) (aiding and abetting only). But see Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 494
(E.D. Mich. 1981). In the face of conflicting lower court decisions, the Sixth Circuit
expressly ducked the issue in Davis, 739 F.2d at 1065.
-9 Stokes, 644 F.2d at 785.
21 Stone v. Fossil Oil & Gas, 657 F. Supp. 1449, 1458 (D.N.M. 1987) (aiding and
abetting only); Woods, 489 F. Supp. at 1294 (aiding and abetting only). But see Farlow,
666 F. Supp. at 1504 (rejecting aiding and abetting).
-o Collins, 605 F.2d at 113. Actually, the court seemed to have accepted aiding
and abetting liability in Monsen, 579 F.2d at 799; however, this holding probably did
not survive Collins. Earlier district court opinions had rejected the conspiracy theory.
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 452 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Dorfman,
336 F. Supp. at 1092.
14 Barker, 797 F.2d at 495; see Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1226; Frymire, 657 F. Supp.
at 892; Ambling, 658 F. Supp. at 1467.
24 Accepting aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories: In re Seagate Technology
Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,435 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23,
1985); Eagle Computer, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,019;
Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 117; deBruin v. Andromeda Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 465 F. Supp.
1276, 1280 (D., Nev. 1979). Rejecting aiding and abetting: Ius v. Butcher, [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,501, at 97,211 (D. Or. 1987); Parquitex Partners
v. Registered Fin. Planning Serv., Inc., [1987 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. *(CCH) 93,255,
at 96,226 (D. Or. 1987); Lazar v. Sadlier, 622 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 1985);
Ahern, 611 F. Supp. at 1486; Diasonics, 599 F. Supp. at 458; Hokama v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1983); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am.
Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Rejecting both aiding and abetting
and conspiracy: McFarland, 493 F. Supp. at 647.
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Inc.,243 and the Eighth in Stokes v. Lokken.244
1. Key Cases
The most influential aiding and abetting/conspiracy case un-
der section 12 is In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 245 in
which a broad range of defendants were sued under section
12(2). In a lengthy discussion, the court traced the "gradual but
progressive expansion of [the 'seller'] concept,"'' 4 citing such
cases as Cady v. Murphy 7 (broker/agent), Wonneman v. Strat-
ford Securities Co.,2" (participation), and Hill York Corp. v.
American International Franchises, Inc.24 9 (proximate cause/sub-
stantial factor). In light of the remedial purposes of the 1933
Act,250 the court favorably examined criminal precedents for
aiding and abetting and for conspiracy liability.25 1 It concluded:
Our interpretation of § 12(2) is, we believe, wholly consistent
with these [remedial] ends. Persons participating directly in a
violation of the statute will not escape liability under the
express language of the Act; similarly those persons who are
aware of and, to some lesser degree, participate in a violation
of the securities laws and either enter into an agreement with
or give assistance to the primary wrongdoers should not be
permitted to escape the imposition of liability.2'-
Examples of collateral participants caught inside the aiding
and abetting net include a bank that encouraged an issuer to
continue to finance itself through a note program although it
-3 810 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1987).
- 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981). Stokes is sufficiently muddled that two later
district court cases in the circuit have rejected aiding and abetting. Antinore v. Alexander
& Alexander Serv., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Minn. 1984); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.
Supp. 1155, 1173 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
A' 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Id. at 379.
113 F.2d at 988.
2" [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
249 448 F.2d at 692-93.
" Caesars Palace, 360 F. Supp. at 382 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)).
2' Id. at 381.
252 Id. at 383.
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knew the issuer was in a precarious financial position;2 3 officers
and directors of an issuer, some of whom personally sold shares
during the class period;254 and a bank and its appraisers who
allegedly inflated the value of the property securing the issuer's
bonds.2 5-
2. Accountants' Cases
A review of accountants' cases under section 12 reveals that
application of the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy theories
provides a mixed bag for the defendants. These theories widen
the scope of potential defendants, bringing in accountants and
other collateral participants who might not be defined as "sell-
ers" under other theories. Unlike the other theories, however,
scienter is a requirement for liability under both aiding and
abetting and conspiracy.2
6
In Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc. ,2 the defendant account-
ing firm Arthur Andersen allegedly over-valued an issuer's assets
with knowledge and intent to assist in the issuer's initial public
offering. Such an allegation was held sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claim.28 A
similar claim and a similar result met Price Waterhouse (PW)
in Lorber v. Beebe259 although the court stressed that to succeed
213 Monsen, 579 F.2d at 801. While banks that engage in only routine commercial
loans will not be deemed sellers, Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 657-58 (N.D. Cal.
1983), banks which cross over the line to develop a special stake in the plaintiff's
investment may be held liable either as sellers or as aiders and abettors. E.g., White v.
ITC Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,105, at 95,436 (D. Or. Aug.
5, 1986); see Gas Reclamation, Inc., 659 F. Supp. at 499 (bank which allegedly reviewed
and approved a private placement document containing numerous misrepresentations
and continued to finance the issuer after learning of claims of fraud was held potentially
liable under § 12).
2 In re Seagate Technology Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,435 at 92,655-3, 92,658 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1985).
21 Frankel, 57 F. Supp. at 744-45.
23 Klein, 602 F. Supp. at 842; Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 117; Stem, 429 F. Supp. at 824.
2" [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,207 (S.D.N.Y. July
8, 1985).
2' Id. at 91,569
2' 407 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Proof of scienter is always important,
as shown in deBruin, 465 F. Supp. at 1280. In deBruin, the defendant accountant did
much accounting work for the issuer and even rustled up a couple of investors, including
the plaintiff. However, the court did not have to decide whether defendant's actions
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at trial the plaintiff would have to establish that PW acted with
scienter.260
In Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc.,261 the
plaintiffs alleged that the firm of Haskins & Sells (H&S) know-
ingly issued a misleading written opinion regarding the flow-
through tax benefits supposedly stemming from the issuer's
plan.26 2 H&S moved to dismiss the section 12(2) claim, but the
court denied the motion, stating:
The defendant contends it did no more than serve as a
general accountant and thus is not liable. The Court finds
nothing incorrect in this statement of law, provided the facts
as developed established this position. The plaintiffs contend
that the facts as presented will show that Haskins and Sells
served as more than a general accountant, that it facilitated
the sale by issuing opinions which it knew or should have
known were false or misleading and that in so doing it aided
and abetted the defendant [issuer].
To some extent any accounting firm issuing an opinion as
to a.particular partnership, corporation or company facilitates
securities transactions .... Yet not all accountants will be
found to be sellers under § 12(2). It is only when the evidence
establishes that there was an aiding or abetting of the seller of
the security or offeror of an investment that liability will be
found to exist.
263
The Sandusky court refused to state exactly what facts might be
required to demonstrate aiding and abetting,264 but in Vogel v.
Trahan 1s allegations that Price Waterhouse rendered advice re-
constituted the type of "substantial participation" necessary to aiding and abetting
theory application because the plaintiff could not prove the accountant acted with
scienter. Id. at 1281.
Lorber, 407 F. Supp at 288.
M" 400 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
= Id. at 442.
Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
" Id.
261 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,303 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
11, 1980). The court in In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 351, 374-75
(N.D. Okla. 1977), appears to have approved aiding and abetting and conspiracy counts
against accountants and attorneys under § 12(2). However, the opinion gives little
indication that these professional defendants had done anything more than what such
professionals normally do.
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garding the availability and the legality of intangible drilling cost
tax deductions adequately stated an aiding and abetting claim.2
3. Arguments Against Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy
Liability
Because of the broad reach of aiding and abetting and of
conspiracy theories, accountant defendants under section 12 will
wish to argue against their application, and several strong ar-
guments exist. The law should be fairly fluid in this area because
circuit courts have offered little authority on the matter.
Starting with matters of statutory construction, all arguments
made in favor of the strict privity approach267 are relevant here.
Although the arguments in favor of strict privity do not abso-
lutely rule out the application of aiding and abetting and con-
spiracy as supplemental theories, they strongly weigh against
their adoption.
Aiding and abetting268 and conspiracy theories are not men-
tioned in the Securities Act of 1933. To introduce these theories
as a method of expanding section 12 liability acts as the "ulti-
mate bootstrap." 269 Arguably, the original expansion of the
"seller" concept under section 12 occurred precisely because the
courts believed they had no basis for invoking aiding and abet-
ting and conspiracy theories. However, after expansionary the-
ories such as participant and proximate cause/substantial factor
became accepted, the Caesars Palace court accepted aiding and
abetting and conspiracy because:
it would be nothing more than an exercise in semantic hair-
splitting for this Court to attempt to delineate a legally cog-
nizable distinction between those categories of persons who
have previously been exposed to liability under § 12(2) and
those persons charged with aiding and abetting and conspiring
in the violation of § 12(2).270
26 Vogel, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,083.
20 See supra notes 111-42 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
20 O'Hara, supra note 49, at 985. It has also been called "backdoor" aiding and
abetting in the § 12(2) context. Phillips & Hanback, Remedies for Defrauded Purchasers,
12 SEC. REG. REv. 943, 957 (1979).
21 Caesars Palace, 360 F. Supp. at 380.
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In considering congressional intent, a strong argument can
be made for rejection of the aiding and abetting and the con-
spiracy theories in the section 12 context. In 1959, Congress
considered but did not pass a proposed amendment which would
have expressly prohibited the aiding and abetting of a securities
law violation. 271 The SEC Staff Memorandum that accompanied
the Senate Bill clearly stated that the proposed amendment was
intended only to prohibit aiding and abetting for purposes of
SEC civil and administrative proceedings, and was not intended
to extend civil liability. 272
Some courts have rejected the aiding and abetting theory on
grounds that its scienter requirement merely duplicates the ele-
ments necessary for recovery under section 10(b). 273 To the extent
that these theories become duplicative, our discussion may be
merely academic. However, to the extent that the two modes of
recovery differ, use of the aiding and abetting theory appears to
violate the notion that collateral theories should not be used to
evade the procedural restrictions of other sections. 274 To allow
aiding and abetting recovery under section 12 would circumvent
the reliance requirement of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act because
the former has no such requirement and the latter does (at least
under some circumstances). 27s The point becomes even clearer
when section 11 enters the analysis. Allowing aiding and abetting
recovery under section 12 will create liability for section 11
defendants, even when the allegedly false statements have been
made outside the registration statement. 27 6 Also, it will allow
recovery against entities not listed as potential defendants in
"' See Securities Acts Amendments, 1959: Hearings on H.R. 5001 Before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 89, 103 (1959).
"2 SEC Legislation: Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1959), cited in Schnei-
der, supra note 49, at 253 n.110.
27 E.g., Beck, 621 F. Supp. at 1562; Hackett v. Village Court Assocs., 602 F.
Supp. 856, 859 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
"I See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
2 Compare Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 782 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(reliance is not a § 12 element) with Rifkin, 574 F.2d at 261-63 (reliance is a § 10(b)
element under some circumstances).
26 Schneider, supra note 49, at 256.
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section 11, such as the banks in Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed
Beef Co. 277 and Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc.278
The end result is that an express primary liability section
(such as section 12) is extended to include a secondary level of
liability which, unlike the primary level, contains a scienter
requirement. Such a result is unusual, to say the least.
279 Sup-
plementary theories, such as aiding and abetting and conspiracy,
complement a "violation' section such as section 10(b) much
better than they do express liability provisions such as sections
11 or 12.20
CONCLUSION
No good reason exists to justify section 12 becoming a
substantial part of the avalanche of legal theories inundating
accountants in recent years. Bringing collateral participants in a
securities offering, such as accountants, within the definition of
section 12 "seller" by using the "proximate cause/substantial
factor" approach seems difficult to justify theoretically and
creates inconsistent and unpredictable results, as the case law
illustrates. Using the aiding and abetting and the conspiracy
approaches to loop the lasso of section 12 liability around non-
"sellers" is similarly unjustified but at least has the virtue of
requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate a defendant's scienter be-
fore liability is imposed.
Section 12 is aimed at "sellers" of securities, making the
strict privity approach to defining "seller" the most logical and
defensible. Under this strict privity approach, accountants and
other collateral participants have little to fear from section 12.
n 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978).
537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982).
2" Comment, Seller Liability, supra note 49, at 400.
nHagert, 520 F. Supp. at 1034; Briggs, 529 F. Supp. at 1173 (quoting 3 A.
BROMBERG, SEcuRruns FRAUD AND CoMMoDrrms FRAUD, § 8.5(315) (1986)).
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